Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 25

Issue 2

Article 6

4-1-2008

Idolatry and Religious Language
Richard Cross

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Cross, Richard (2008) "Idolatry and Religious Language," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of
Christian Philosophers: Vol. 25 : Iss. 2 , Article 6.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200825217
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol25/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

IDOLATRY AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
Richard Cross

Upholding a univocity theory of religious language does not entail idolatry,
because nothing about univocity entails misidentifying God altogether —
which is what idolatry amounts to. Upholders and opponents of univocity
can agree on the object to which they are ascribing various attributes, even if
they do not agree on the attributes themselves. Neither does the defender of
univocity have to maintain that there is anything real really shared by God
and creatures. Furthermore, even if much of language is analogous, syllo
gistic argument—and hence theology's scientific status, as accepted by the
scholastics —requires univocity.

1. A Theological Problem: Idolatry
The argument from univocity to idolatry crops up a lot in recent theologi
cal literature. As Burrell nicely shows in "Creator /Creatures Relation," the
argument is based on a theological intuition—about illegitimately import
ing the creaturely into the divine realm—that has a long and distinguished
theological history. For all that, the charge looks to be a mistake, seeming
to rest on a confusion between two different ways of understanding the
nature of a certain sort of theological error—specifically, on a confusion
between two different ways of understanding that claim that God fails to
have a certain attribute. The confusion is easily described. Let ^ be any
alleged attribute proper to the God of the Abrahamic religions, such that
creatures fail to be ^. Suppose the upholder of univocity wants to assert
that God too fails to be ^ —as she will on occasion want to, since she be
lieves that there are some words that can be predicated in the same sense
of God and creatures. What she intends to claim is that the God of the
Abrahamic religions is not ^. This may be a theological error, but it is not
idolatry. The claim is de re—that the God of the Abrahamic religions is not
^. To be guilty of idolatry, the theologian would at the very least need to
understand the claim de dicto: that it is not the case that God is ^ —perhaps
because a statue is God, or a tree is: genuinely idolatrous claims. But the
de re assertion does not entail the de dicto one. So upholding univocity does
not entail idolatry, because upholding univocity does not entail misidentifying God altogether—which I take it is what idolatry amounts to.
So the dispute between the upholder of univocity and her opponent is
genuinely theological, and it is genuinely about one and the same God—
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But setting aside the rather extrav
agant rhetoric of idolatry, there is a substantive point to the opponent's

FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 25 No. 2 April 2008
All rights reserved

190

IDOLATRY AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

191

riposte, and it is that the upholder of univocity makes a serious theological
error, denying of the creator of the universe attributes which should be
proper to him, and, by the same token, ascribing to him attributes which
should be proper to his creation—thus blurring the distinction between
creator and creature. Even thus described, it is not clear to me that the
upholder of univocity is guilty. Typically, the upholder of univocity main
tains that there are some words that we use of God and creatures that have
the same meanings in these two applications. The two major medieval
Christian protagonists in this debate, at least as presented in the modern
literature, are Aquinas and Scotus, and these two theologians agree that
meanings of words are concepts (I will return to this below). So the univocity position amounts to the claim that there are some concepts under
whose extension both God and creatures fall. Concepts are typically held
by medieval theologians to be merely mental entities, and the defender of
univocity does not generally accept that the view that there are concepts
under whose extension both God and creatures fall entails that there is
something extramental really common to, or shared by, God and crea
tures. Now, some upholders of univocity may do this: Burrell cites Mary
Beth Ingham's slightly ambiguous claim that there is "something common
to God and the created order." Since Scotus believes that, in order to ac
count for the fact that things of the same kind fall under the extension of
some one species-concept, we need to posit some kind of common nature,
really shared by things of that kind, it might be thought that he should
generalize from this and claim that, to account for any case where things
fall under the extension of some one concept, we need to posit some kind
of real commonality between them. But there are clear counterexamples to
this more general claim. For example, cats and dogs fall under the exten
sion of the concept animal—but there is no reason to suppose that there
is something real, animality, common to them. The concept animal is a
vicious abstraction. Nothing is just an animal. Things are animals in virtue
of being particular kinds of thing—cats and dogs, for example—and the
fact that cats and dogs fall under the extension of the concept animal is
explained simply by the fact that they are cats and dogs: anything which
is a cat is an animal, and anything which is a dog is an animal. I will return
below to the question of whether positing some real commonality entails
undermining the distinction between God and creatures.
In fact, Scotus is clear throughout his discussions that he wants to claim
no more than that there are concepts under whose extension both God and
creatures fall—not that there are common real properties really shared by
God and creatures. Still, this claim of conceptual commonality is itself the
so-called "onto-theological" position that Burrell and others find so ob
jectionable, the claim that allegedly undermines the distinction between
God and creatures. It is not clear to me, however, that this assessment is
correct. One common way of developing the argument is to make another
assertion of idolatry: namely, that in positing some such concept—say be
ing—the uni vocalist is idolatrously placing something real higher than
God—namely, Being. But this is clearly misguided. Scotus, for example,
is committed to no such thing. Concepts are not things in the real world,
and there is no need to posit any real thing (such as a common nature
or universal) other than the individuals realizing the concept. And this
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seems to refute the objection that univocity somehow undermines the dis
tinction between God and creatures. God is not wholly unlike creatures,
after all. But in positing the possibility of univocal concepts, a theologian
is not ipso facto making God just another creature. The semantic theory is
neutral on the question of the degree of real, ontological likeness between
God and creatures. As it happens, Scotus accepts the traditional view that
creatures imitate God by being, in their way, representations of him: God
is the exemplar cause of creatures, and they are "measured" by him (see
Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 2, q. un. [Vatican, 3:180]). This, presumably, al
lows for univocity without an appeal to shared attributes common to God
and creatures.
Perhaps the alleged problem is that accepting univocal concepts re
quires accepting that God can somehow be grasped by the human intellect—and that this makes him less transcendent. I suppose we here bump
up against apophaticism, and different senses of what it might be cogni
tively to "grasp" God. I am sure that the univocalist would want to say of
God what we understand that God is good, and more besides, and that the
univocalist would not want to say that God is merely the "more besides,"
and none of what we understand of what goodness is—which I take it is
the burden of the serious apophaticist. But apophaticism as serious as this
is not theologically required in order to maintain the distinction between
God and creatures. After all, everyone agrees that creatures resemble God
in certain ways, and in order to maintain the distinction between God and
creatures, it is not required that we be unable to specify any of the ways
in which creatures resemble God. Neither is it required that we identify
God with his own act of existence. There are plenty of other ways of iden
tifying God as necessary and creatures as contingent—and this identifica
tion seems sufficient for the relevant distinction—for "the Distinction,"
as Burrell puts it. Scotus himself takes pains to show just how his view is
compatible with divine perfection—and, indeed, how opposing views are
vulnerable to the objection that they diminish divine perfection, by deny
ing that things that it is better to be than not to be—pure perfections—are
in God. The argument is that we can find such perfections in creatures. If
God fails to have them, then he fails to be wholly perfect. Since the perfec
tions are the same, the concepts representing them must be univocal (see
Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2 [Vatican, 3:25]). I will return to the no
tions of the "same" perfections and "same" concepts below.
In fact, not even a more realist account of the properties had by God
and creatures need undermine the distinction between God and the
world. Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that we were to accept that
there are universal properties shared between God and creatures. Would
this make the property more absolute than God? Would the world of the
creature somehow impinge on the divine world? On the first of these, the
property would only be more absolute than God if we were to accept some
kind of Platonic theory according to which universals are prior to the indi
viduals that exemplify them. But this is a minority theory, I would judge;
most philosophers who accept universals take the more Aristotelian line
that universals are parasitic on individuals, and not vice versa. Neither
would the view entail holding that the world of the creature somehow im
pinges on God. We would not have to accept that the relevant universals
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are automatically creaturely; they could be wholly divine in their divine
exemplifications and wholly creaturely in their creaturely exemplifica
tions. Suppose that there were real genus-universals—animality, for ex
ample, shared by cats and dogs. Asserting that the property is shared does
not entail that something proper to cats is somehow impinging on the
dog world, or vice versa. Something instantiated by cats is instantiated by
dogs too. Considered in abstraction from its instantiation, we would need
to say that animality is neither cat-like nor dog-like. Pari passu, consid
ered in abstraction from its instantiation, any property shared by God and
creatures is neither divine nor creaturely—though of course it needs to be
realized in one or other of these (God or creatures): it is never instantiated
without these, and neither are they instantiated without it. Still, I discuss
this theoretically merely, because it is not clear to me that there are any
theologians who consciously and deliberately accept this view.
2. A Philosophical Problem: Religious Language
Burrell makes a further and more general point, less theological, about the
irresistably analogical nature of much of our language. As he puts it, "the
shoe ends up on the other foot: it is univocal rather than analogical usage
which requires explication." Well, a lot of this depends on one's general
semantic theory, and this is not the place to enter into a discussion of such
vexed territory. I will offer one small observation. No medieval thinker
accepted anything other than what we might loosely label an "ideational"
theory of meaning—meanings are ideas or concepts (whether concepts be
understood as mental objects [of thought] or as mental acts [of thought]).
Aquinas summarizes this as follows: "Words are signs of thoughts, and
thoughts are likenesses of things" (Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 1). These
thoughts or concepts are representations (Aquinas here calls them "like
nesses") of things. They are distinct from the real properties and relations
of which they are concepts, in the sense of being mental representations
numerically distinct from the real items which they represent. But in so
far as the concepts are representations of things, they convey informational
content about the things they represent, and this informational content ex
actly corresponds to the extramental properties or relations themselves. In
this context, Aquinas talks about the res significata, the thing signified by
a word (Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 3). When doing so, he wishes to draw
attention to the fact that the relation between word, concept, and thing is
such that, in virtue jointly of a word's signifying a concept and of a con
cept's representing a thing, we can claim that the word signifies the thing
too. So when Aquinas talks about the res significata, the thing signified, he
means to talk both about the extramental perfection, and about the con
cept representing that perfection. This is important, because Aquinas is
happy to identify the meaning of a word predicated of 'God' and of 'crea
tures' as one res significata (Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 3)—one concept,
representing one perfection. Now, according to Aquinas's well-known
teaching in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 5, words are used univocally when
they signify identical conceptual contents—one ratio—and they are used
equivocally when they signify many "totally distinct" rationes. Words are
used analogically when they signify many rationes related by some kind
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of "community," "order," or "proportion." Since Aquinas identifies the
meaning of a word predicated of 'God' and of 'creatures' as one res significata, the whole teaching seems to entail that one concept can include many
related rationes: many related conceptual contents or meanings.
Views similar to this—though developed at greater length and in rather
different directions—motivated Scotus to accept some requirement of univocity in this context. Underlying Scotus's move is a very simple thought,
elegantly expressed by Burrell:
if theologia is to be a scientia, then it must proceed by argument, and
Socrates showed us that any responsible argument demands that the
key terms "stand still"; they cannot be shifting meanings midstream,
as it were. Fair enough.
Scotus states the thought thus:
I call that concept univocal which is one in such a way that its unity is
sufficient for a contradiction when affirmed and denied of the same
thing, and also is sufficient for a syllogistic middle term, such that the
extremes are united in the middle term which is one in such a way that
they can be united between themselves without the fallacy of equivo
cation. (Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, n. 26 [Vatican, 3:18])
What worries Scotus is that the way of proceeding adopted by his oppo
nents makes it impossible to give a philosophically accessible account of the
individuation of concepts, and thus of the meanings of words. And with
out an account of the "same" meaning, we cannot reason syllogistically.
(I add "philosophically accessible" because we could insist not only that
theological propositions but also the logical relations between them are
revealed by God, and thus that we can individuate the relevant concepts
on purely theological grounds; but I know of no thinker who would hold
this.) On the contrary, Scotus insists, we believe that theology is scientific,
and if we believe this, then in turn we ought epistemically to accept that
that the words it uses have the same meanings. But notions of the same
meaning (the same ratio) themselves become meaningless in an account
that can allow one and the same concept (res significata) to embrace dif
ferent meanings or different conceptual contents (rationes)—at least if it
be thought, as it is on the accepted ideational theory of meaning, that the
meanings of words just are concepts of the sort alluded to. What Scotus's
account shows is that, at the very least, given an ideational theory such as
that which both he and Aquinas accept, scientific argumentation requires
univocity: the notion here that meanings, conceptual contents, and con
cepts all coincide. If we were to accept, for example, a "meaning-as-use"
kind of semantic theory, the position might be very different: the notion
of univocity might, indeed, lose all purchase, much as Burrell suggests.
But Burrell's argument is primarily historical, and so too is mine. Note
that none of this requires that we deny that much language is irresistibly
analogical, much as Burrell maintains. But Scotus's point is that there are
still significant theological loci where univocity is required, at least on the
semantic theory accepted by him and Aquinas.
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Still, perhaps the medievals were wrong to think of theology as in any
sense sdentific—indeed, wrong to think of it even as a domain in which
the use of syllogistic reasoning is permissible. But Scotus has another,
more general concern, also expressed in the passage just quoted. Unless
the meanings of the words are exactly the same, then certain apparent
theological contradictions turn out not be such. Scotus gives a well-known
and very elegant example:
Every intellect that is certain of one concept and doubtful about oth
ers has a concept of which it is certain other than the concepts about
which it is doubtful. . . . But the intellect of a wayfarer can be certain
that God is a being while doubtful whether he is a finite or an infinite
being, or created or uncreated. . . . For every philosopher was certain
that that which he posited to be the first principle was a being (for
example, one that fire was a being, and another that water was). But
he was certain neither that it was first (for then he would have been
certain of something false, and the false cannot be known), nor that
it was not first (for then he would not have posited the opposite).
(Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, nn. 27, 29 [Vatican, 3:18-19])
What Scotus is claiming is that, if "God is a finite being" and "God is an
infinite being" are contradictories, then 'being' is used univocally in the
two cases. This looks plausible, and is sufficient to establish that there are
some concepts—here, being—under whose extension both God and crea
tures fall ('finite being,' after all, is not obviously meaningless). It is worth
keeping in mind that Aquinas himself accepts that univocity is required
for the possibility of contradiction. At one point, he wonders whether or
not the term 'God' is said univocally in the following two cases: "This idol
is God" (uttered by an idolater), and "This same idol is not God" (uttered
by a Catholic). Aquinas concludes that it is, and thus holds that the idola
ter goes wrong because he understands the sense of the word 'God,' but
predicates it of something that could not be God:
Whence it is clear that the Catholic, saying that the idol is not God,
contradicts the pagan who asserts that it is, because both use this
name 'God' to signify the true God. (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.
13, a. 10 ad 1)
Aquinas goes on to note in the same passage that when the Catholic truly
says of the same idol "This idol is (a) god," 'God' is then used homony
mously with its use in the Catholic's utterance "This idol is not God." So
univocity is required for contradictoriness.
I will return to a possible Thomist response to Scotus's argument in a
moment. But first, I want to dispose of a specious objection. It could be ar
gued that the two claims are not contradictory because the two claimants
might simply be talking about different objects altogether. This would be
possible on the de dicto readings of the two claims: person a claims that
God is an infinite being, and person b that it is not the case that God is an
infinite being. In this case, person a and person b do not agree on the ref
erence of 'God,' and so do not necessarily, or unambiguously, contradict
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each other. But Scotus clearly has in mind the de re readings: the thing that
is God is a finite being, or the thing that is God is an infinite being. Thus,
person a claims of God that it is a finite being; person b claims of God that
it is an infinite being. These de re claims are certainly contradictory, and the
possibility that our two claimants can contradict each other seems to allow
that being is univocal.
So what could Aquinas say in response? Fundamentally, given that he
accepts that univocity is required for contradictoriness, and given that he
denies that 'being,' predicated of God and creatures, is univocal, he would
be constrained to deny that the two disputants in Scotus's example con
tradict each other. He will say instead that at least one of them is uttering
something meaningless. If 'being' means "existence proper to creatures,"
then there are no infinite beings; if 'being' means "existence proper to
God," then there are no finite beings. In the first sense, the claim that there
is an infinite being is meaningless; in the second, the claim that there is
a finite being is meaningless. Aquinas, in short, would deny that, if 'be
ing' must be understood univocally, then anyone legitimately enquires
whether God is a finite being or an infinite being. In short, the two protag
onists do not contradict each other at all. We cannot legitimately make the
Scotist enquiry, so we cannot conclude therefrom that 'being' is univocal.
But we can certainly agree that contradictoriness is sufficient for univocity.
Aquinas's denial of univocity in this context is not incoherent. But it can
be seen on closer inspection to be counterintuitive; this attempted defense
was an argument made up after the fact to support a position arrived at
on quite different grounds.
I am not here defending a particular view of theological language. I
am certainly not asserting that such language needs to be univocal. I am
asserting that, given certain semantic and methodological assumptions
made conspicuously by some medieval theologians, including Aquinas,
univocity turns out to be required for all sorts of discourse, and partic
ularly for theological discourse. It seems, then, that the question of the
distinction between philosophical theology and philosophy of religion is
one that needs to be decided not on theological grounds—in terms of a
(specious) charge of idolatry—but on philosophical grounds: in terms of
an evaluation of various rival semantic theories. And this is not likely to
be an easy task, or one that is settled quickly—theories of concepts are as
contested as ever, and there is by no means an established consensus on
the matter.1
University o f Notre Dame

NOTE
1. I develop some of the material in this essay in much more detail in
my article "Univocity and Mystery," in Metaphysics as Scientia Transcendens,
ed. Roberto Hofmeister Pich and Jakob Hans Schneider (Louvain-la-Neuve:
FIDEM, 2007).

